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THE DEATH OF THE PUBLIC FORUM IN CYBERSPACE 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115 (2005) 
Dawn C. Nunziato [FNd1] 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Throughout the past decade, the Internet has been conceptualized as a forum for 
free expression with near limitless potential for individuals to express themselves and to 
access the expression of others. Indeed, some Internet law scholars have claimed that the 
Internet will enable us to realize, for the first time in our nation's history, the free speech 
values embodied in the First Amendment. Other Internet law scholars have claimed that 
the Internet should be conceptualized as one grand "public forum"--First Amendment 
parlance for a place in which the right to free speech receives its strongest protection. 
These scholars claim that the Internet's architecture and structure facilitate freedom of 
expression and that, to advance the cause of freedom of expression, the United States 
government should simply get out of the way and hand over the regulation of Internet 
speech to private regulators. [FN1] 
 
 During the Clinton Administration, the United States government essentially 
acceded to these calls for privatization, undertook measures to turn over many aspects of 
the Internet to private entities, and convinced Congress to do the same. With the 
government's withdrawal from management of the Internet, private entities assumed 
control. The end result is that the vast majority of speech on the Internet today occurs 
within private places and spaces that are owned and regulated by private entities such as 
Internet service providers (ISPs) like America Online (AOL) and Yahoo!, Internet access 
providers like employers and universities, content providers like washingtonpost.com and 
nytimes.com, and pipeline providers like Comcast and Verizon. In contrast to real space 
(which enjoys a mixture of privately- and publicly-owned places in which speech occurs) 
and in contrast to media channels such as broadcast and cable television (which enjoy 
publicly-subsidized and public forums), speech in cyberspace occurs almost exclusively 
within privately-owned places. The public/private balance that characterizes real space 
and renders the First Amendment meaningful within it is all but absent in cyberspace. 
Private regulation of speech on the Internet has grown pervasive, and is substantially 
unchecked by the Constitution's protections for free speech, which generally apply only 
to state actors' regulations of speech. At an earlier stage of the Supreme Court's First 
Amendment jurisprudence, such private speech regulation might have been subject to the 
dictates of the First Amendment under the state action doctrine. [FN2] The Supreme 
Court, however, has substantially limited the application of the state action doctrine in 
past decades, and courts have been unwilling to extend this doctrine to treat private 
regulators of Internet speech as state actors for purposes of subjecting such regulation to 
First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
 Given the judicial contraction of the state action doctrine, ISPs and other private 
regulators of Internet speech will likely continue to be exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny. The result of such privatization is that the vast majority of Internet speech 
regulation is conducted by private parties who are not subject to the First Amendment's 
protections for free speech. Those private entities have sole discretion over whether and 
how speech is regulated in such privately-owned places. Some scholars applaud this 
result and contend that free speech values are best advanced by facilitating a proliferation 
of private speech decisions without intervention or control by the government. [FN3] 
According to this conception of the First Amendment, the sole function of this 
constitutional guarantee is the negative one of checking the government's restrictions of 
speech. 
 
 This negative conception of the First Amendment, however, fails to account for 
the important affirmative role that the government has played, and should continue to 
play, in facilitating freedom of speech and correcting imperfections in the market for free 
expression. In particular, this negative conception fails to account for the important role 
the government plays in providing public forums for expression and protecting speech 
from censorship within such forums. Under the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine, 
the government has the affirmative obligation to dedicate public property, of the kind 
traditionally well-suited to the expression and exchange of ideas, to the public's use for 
free speech purposes. Indeed, it is only within such public forums that free speech rights 
are accorded their most robust protection. Government regulations of speech within such 
public forums are subject to the most exacting First Amendment scrutiny, and, 
accordingly, individuals enjoy their strongest free speech rights within such forums. 
The required existence of public forums ameliorates the inequalities that disparities in 
private property ownership would otherwise impose on individuals' free speech rights. To 
exercise their free speech rights meaningfully, individuals need forums from which to 
express themselves. Yet many individuals do not own property, much less property from 
which they can effectively express themselves on matters of importance within our 
democratic system. The requirement that the government maintain public forums 
compels the government to provide such individuals with forums from which to exercise 
their First Amendment rights. Public forums, at least in real space, therefore subsidize the 
speech of those who otherwise would not be able to express themselves effectively. 
On the Internet, however, essentially no places exist to serve as "public forums" because 
the places within which expression occurs are overwhelmingly privately owned. As a 
result, the government's affirmative role of advancing free speech by providing speakers 
with meaningful forums from which to express themselves free of censorship is non-
existent on the Internet. 
 
 The absence of public forums in cyberspace augurs the absence of meaningful 
protection for free speech under the First Amendment. In real space, the existence of 
government-owned property as a forum for speech available to all comers provides an 
important guarantee for such speech. In contrast, as increasingly more speech takes place 
in cyberspace, the affirmative constitutional protections for free speech that exist in real 
space are in danger of being sacrificed. In particular, the government's abdication of 
control over Internet speech regulation may well result in the loss of protection for speech 
that is insufficiently protected within an unregulated market for speech (viz., unpopular 
and poorly-subsidized speech). 
 
 Congress and the courts have declined to take the steps necessary to update First 
Amendment jurisprudence to account for modern communications media and the radical 
shift in the public/private balance within such media. The Supreme Court recently 
declined to accord public forum status (and therefore declined to extend meaningful First 
Amendment protection) to even the comparatively minor portion of public "property" on 
the Internet. In United States v. American Library Ass'n, [FN4] the Court held that public 
libraries' provision of Internet access via publicly-owned computers did not constitute a 
public forum and therefore that restrictions on speech in that context were not subject to 
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny. As a result of this and similar developments, the 
important functions served by the First Amendment in general and by the public forum 
doctrine in particular are in danger of being seriously eroded in cyberspace. Despite the 
common perception among members of the public and Internet law scholars that the 
Internet is a forum for free expression of unprecedented scope and importance, in fact 
there are essentially no places on the Internet where speech is constitutionally protected 
against censorship. 
 
 In Part II of this Article, I describe the scope and extent of private ownership of 
the Internet and private regulation of Internet forums for speech. Having been encouraged 
by Congress to assume the mantle of Internet speech regulation, private entities have 
imposed substantial controls on Internet speech. Courts, following the Supreme Court's 
contraction of the state action doctrine, have likewise declined to subject private Internet 
speech regulation to First Amendment scrutiny.  In Part III, I analyze the important role 
served by public forums within our system of democratic self-government. I set forth two 
competing conceptions of the First Amendment, the first of which is consistent with the 
privatization of the Internet and the second of which informs the public forum doctrine. 
Under the first conception, the First Amendment is conceptualized purely as a restraint on 
government restrictions on speech and has no role in scrutinizing private regulation of 
speech. Under the second conception, the First Amendment imposes obligations on the 
government and other regulators of speech to provide meaningful opportunities for 
expression free of censorship. This conception finds its clearest expression in the public 
forum doctrine, under which courts impose the affirmative obligation on the government 
to dedicate certain publicly-held property for the use and benefit of individuals seeking to 
exercise their free speech rights. I explore the speech facilitating roles served by public 
forums in real space, and examine what the absence of public forums means for 
cyberspace. 
 
 In Part IV, I analyze United States v. American Library Ass'n. After analyzing 
this and other cases declining to meaningfully apply First Amendment scrutiny to the 
government's restrictions of speech within Internet forums, I set forth in Part V several 
ways in which courts and legislatures should act to reintroduce the values of the public 
forum into cyberspace. 
 
II. PRIVATE REGULATION OF SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 
 
A. The Early Years: The Internet's Promise as an Unprecedented Forum for Free 
Expression 
 
 Over the past decade, the Internet has been conceptualized as a forum for free 
expression of unprecedented scope and importance. Once Congress lifted limitations on 
the permissible uses of the Internet, the Internet opened up as a forum for expression of 
all kinds, [FN5] and speakers and publishers from all walks of life and from every corner 
of the world flocked to the Internet. [FN6] As one court explained, "It is no exaggeration 
to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most 
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country--and indeed the world--has yet 
seen." [FN7] 
 
 Several features constitutive of today's Internet [FN8] render it a uniquely 
powerful vehicle for speakers and publishers to express themselves to worldwide 
audiences at very low cost. [FN9] For the (very low) cost of establishing a website, an 
individual can express herself in the context of a whole host of media--text, images, audio, 
video--to a virtually unlimited array of listeners. The barriers to entry that exist in other 
mediums of expressions, such as traditional print publication and broadcast media, are 
drastically reduced in the context of the Internet. In contrast to traditional broadcast 
media, where the ability to express oneself widely is constrained by substantial licensing 
requirements and associated fees, the Internet is not shackled by spectrum scarcity, nor 
by the onerous licensing requirements or fees necessitated by a limited broadcast 
spectrum. As a result, the Internet, to a much greater extent than traditional methods of 
expression, has the potential to facilitate a true marketplace of ideas, one that is not 
dominated by the few wealthy speakers who are able to express themselves effectively 
via traditional media. [FN10] 
 
 Because of the Internet's unprecedented speech-facilitating characteristics, early 
commentators contended that the Internet should be conceptualized as one grand public 
forum. [FN11] Consistent with the speech utopian rhetoric of early court decisions like 
the district court opinion in ACLU v. Reno, commentators viewed the Internet as 
constituting an important new forum for public discourse. Perhaps because it was not 
precisely clear to what extent the government would involve itself in the ownership and 
control of the Internet, early commentators believed that the "National Information 
Infrastructure" would preserve an important place for genuine public forums in 
cyberspace. As government ownership and control of the Internet has substantially 
receded, however, the role of public forums in cyberspace has substantially differed from 
these commentators' predictions. 
 
B. Private Regulation of Internet Speech Forums 
 
 Despite the Internet's potential as a forum for expression of unprecedented scope 
and importance, today private actors wield the vast majority of power over Internet 
speech--power unchecked by the First Amendment. While it is often presumed that 
speech on the Internet will be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," [FN12] the private 
entities that own and control the forums for Internet speech enjoy and often exercise the 
unfettered power to impose substantial restrictions on such speech. 
The extent of such private speech restrictions is staggering. Each of the major ISPs 
establishes and enforces Terms of Service by which it prohibits the expression of certain 
types of speech that fall within the protection of the First Amendment. AOL, for example, 
specifies in its Terms of Service that AOL and its agents "have the right at their sole 
discretion to remove any content that, in America Online's judgment . . . [is] harmful, 
objectionable, or inaccurate." [FN13] AOL explains in its Community Guidelines that 
"like any city, we take pride in--and are protective of--our community." [FN14] Unlike 
any other city, however, AOL enjoys the unfettered discretion to censor constitutionally-
protected speech in its discussion forums and other online spaces, including "vulgar 
language" (which, it warns, is "no more appropriate online than [it] would be at 
Thanksgiving dinner"), "crude conversations about sex," and "discussions about . . . 
illegal drug abuse that imply it is acceptable." [FN15] AOL members may hope to escape 
from these speech-restrictive Terms of Service by leaving AOL-sponsored forums and 
expressing themselves elsewhere on the Internet. AOL, however, informs its members 
that "as an AOL member, you are required to follow our [Terms of Service] no matter 
where you are on the Internet," and warns that it may terminate the accounts of users who 
violate its Terms of Service by engaging in AOL-prohibited speech anywhere on the 
Internet. [FN16] 
 
 Internet users seeking stronger protection for their expression might turn to an ISP 
other than AOL. They will find, however, similar restrictions on speech imposed by 
many other major ISPs. Yahoo!'s Terms of Service, for example, prohibit users from 
making available content that is, inter alia, "objectionable," and specify that Yahoo! may 
pre-screen and remove any such "objectionable" content. [FN17] Similarly, Comcast 
prohibits users from disseminating material that "a reasonable person could deem to be 
objectionable, embarrassing, . . . or otherwise inappropriate, regardless of whether this 
material or its dissemination is unlawful." [FN18] And Comcast, by its Terms of Service, 
"reserves the right . . . to refuse to transmit or post and to remove or block any 
information or materials . . . that it, in its sole discretion, deems to be . . . inappropriate, 
regardless of whether this material or its dissemination is unlawful." [FN19] 
Colleges and universities, both private and public, serve as Internet access providers for 
millions of students across the United States. Many of these have established and 
enforced "acceptable use policies" that substantially restrict First Amendment protected 
speech. To list just a representative sample: Colby College restricts speech that may 
cause "a loss of self-esteem" within the individual to whom it is addressed; [FN20] 
Brown University prohibits speech that produces "feelings of impotence, anger, or 
disenfranchisement," whether "intentional or unintentional"; [FN21] while Bowdoin 
College restricts jokes and stories that are "experienced by others as harassing." [FN22] 
The amount of communication via e-mail has far surpassed the amount of communication 
via "snail" mail. While the U.S. Postal Service is subject to the dictates of the First 
Amendment when performing its duties, the private entities that are predominantly 
responsible for relaying billions of e-mails per day are not, thus these entities are free to 
monitor and censor  the content of the e-mails that they are responsible for delivering. 
Private employers, which serve as Internet access providers for millions of employees 
across the United States, routinely monitor and restrict e-mail (and Internet use generally), 
with approximately 50-60% of employers monitoring e-mail. [FN23] In short, the vast 
majority of Internet access and service providers, which are privately owned, assert and 
exercise substantial control over the expression that flows through their Internet places. 
 
 In the remainder of this Section, I set forth a few representative scenarios that 
elucidate the nature and extent of such private regulations of Internet speech. These 
examples demonstrate the ways in which private entities, including Internet providers like 
Google, AOL, and Yahoo!, have broadly exercised the power to regulate and censor 
speech on the Internet wholly exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
Google is the largest and most popular Internet search engine, providing access to billions 
of websites and serving as the first place most people turn to find information on the 
Internet. In addition to providing links to webpages as results for search terms, Google 
also provides "sponsored links," which are advertisements keyed to search terms entered 
by web surfers. Because of Google's dominant position in the search engine market, the 
ability to secure a sponsored link is a valuable medium of expression on the Internet. 
Indeed, for many less well-known advocacy groups and causes whose sites do not 
otherwise enjoy substantial web traffic, sponsored links serve as an important means of 
drawing attention to the sites' content. Google, however, has been wielding its power as a 
private speech regulator to censor a considerable amount of valuable expression, 
including political speech that would fall within the core of the First Amendment's 
protection. Adhering to its policy of refusing to accept sponsored links that "advocate 
against any individual, group, or organization," [FN24] Google has refused to host a 
range of politically-charged, religious, and critical social commentary in the form of 
advertisements themselves, as well as the websites to which these advertisements link. 
Google has also required prospective advertisers to alter the content within their 
sponsored links--as well as within their websites--as a condition for Google's hosting 
such content. Furthermore, Google's speech regulations and restrictions apply not only on 
Google's site but also on other websites that run the sponsored links, including AOL, Ask 
Jeeves, and EarthLink. [FN25] 
 
 A few instances of such censorship illuminate the extent of Google's power as a 
private regulator of speech. In August 2004, W. Frederick Zimmerman, who maintains a 
political website called the Zimmerblog, sought to advertise his book Basic Documents 
About the Detainees at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, which contained, inter alia, the full 
text of the Hamdi v. Bush, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, and Rasul v. Bush opinions, as well as 
various applicable Geneva Convention documents. Google suspended Zimmerman's 
account once it became aware of the material Zimmerman was advertising via this 
sponsored link, informing Zimmerman that "Google policy does not permit the 
advertisement of websites that contain 'sensitive issues."' [FN26] In a similar incident in 
June 2004, John Perr, author of the PERRspectives website, which contains "left-of-
center" political commentary, sought to advertise his website via a Google Sponsored 
Link, with advertisements entitled "The Liberal Resource: Analysis, Commentary, and 
Satire" and "Complete Liberal Resource Center." The linked-to website contained an 
article written by Perr that was critical of President George W. Bush and which 
characterized the president, inter alia, as "secretive, paranoid, and vengeance-filled." 
[FN27] Once Google became aware of this language within Perr's article, a Google 
representative informed Perr that Google was removing his sponsored link because it 
linked to a website that contained text critical of Bush and therefore "advocates against 
an individual, group, or organization," in violation of Google's policy. [FN28] 
It is not only political or socially-charged speech that runs the risk of censorship by 
Google; religious speech also appears to be a target. For example, while Google generally 
permits sponsored links for abortion services, it prohibits all sponsored links for abortion 
services that make any reference to religion. [FN29] Google also singles out for special 
treatment links sponsored by the Church of Scientology and requires that particular 
language appear in any link sponsored by this church. [FN30] No other religion is subject 
to the requirement that particular language be contained within its advertisements. In 
short, Google enjoys and exercises substantial censorial control over the content of 
sponsored links (as well as the content of websites linked to by such sponsored links) that 
appear on Google's search page. 
 
 AOL is by far the largest ISP in the world, with over twenty-four million 
subscribers in the United States. [FN31] Indeed, AOL is responsible for hosting the 
exchange of more messages on a daily basis than the United States Post Office. [FN32] It 
is also the largest single forum for individuals to express themselves online, offering 
thousands of discussion forums on a wide variety of topics. Within these discussion 
groups, AOL's twenty million plus subscribers can express their views on topics of 
concern to them and engage in online debates with other interested individuals. 
One of the discussion forums hosted by AOL is the "Irish Heritage" discussion group for 
individuals interested in Irish history and politics. [FN33] In 1998, AOL's discussion 
forum "monitors" grew concerned about the heated nature of the discussions within this 
forum and apparently felt that some of the contributions were getting out of hand. [FN34] 
AOL determined that several exchanges on the Irish Heritage discussion group were in 
violation of AOL's terms of service, which do not allow members to "harass, threaten, 
embarrass, or do anything else to another member that is unwanted." Accordingly, AOL 
shut down the discussion group for a "cooling off" period, and in the process removed all 
traces of the earlier heated postings, contrary to AOL's regular practice of preserving past 
discussions in its archives. [FN35] After a seventeen-day cooling off period, AOL 
reopened the discussion group, while encouraging members to make this forum "a more 
amiable place" and announcing that members who committed three or more violations 
would face suspension or termination of their accounts. [FN36] 
 
 AOL's speech restrictions do not stop with the Irish Heritage discussion group. As 
discussed above, AOL has long imposed rigorous regulations on the vast amount of 
speech that it hosts in AOL-owned places, prohibiting speech that advocates the illegal 
use of drugs, speech that uses "crude" or "inappropriate" terminology in connection with 
sex, and the like. [FN37] AOL's censorial actions within its discussion groups are now 
well-known. Accordingly, the "unprecedented forum for free expression" that is the 
Internet in actuality is largely dominated by AOL's forums for expression, wherein the 
regulation of speech is subject to AOL's Terms of Service. 
AOL is, of course, a private company, and the servers on which it hosts its discussion 
forums are its private property. Because it is a private entity, the determinations that it 
makes regarding the types of expression allowed within its property are not subject to 
scrutiny under the First Amendment. AOL enjoys complete discretion to allow or 
disallow whatever speech it likes on the vast number of discussion forums and websites 
that it hosts, and to enforce its speech restrictions by removing unwanted speech and 
prohibiting unwanted speakers from partaking in its discussion forums. Accordingly, for 
the great majority of Internet speakers, it is not the First Amendment, but AOL's (or other 
ISPs') terms of service, that determine the contours of protection accorded to their 
Internet expression. 
 
 The popular ISP Yahoo! recently fought and won a highly publicized 
international battle on behalf of free speech and First Amendment values, only to turn 
around and exercise its prerogative as a private speech regulator to censor the same 
constitutionally protected speech that it fought to protect. In La Ligue Contre le Racisme 
et l'Antisémitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., [FN38] several French organizations committed to 
combating anti-Semitism brought suit in French court against Yahoo!. [FN39] Plaintiffs 
alleged that Yahoo!'s auction site was hosting auctions of materials such as The Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion, Mein Kampf, and other Nazi materials and memorabilia, the 
display of which within France violated French law. The French lawsuit, which involved 
novel issues of international jurisdiction and choice of law, ultimately resulted in a 
French court order compelling Yahoo! to cease making available the specified anti-
Semitic content to French citizens (which essentially required Yahoo! to cease making 
this content available on the Internet at all). [FN40] 
 
 Yahoo! was concerned that the French court would be able to enforce this order 
against it within the United States. To forestall the enforcement of the French court's 
order within the United States, Yahoo! filed suit in U.S. district court against the French 
organizations. The company claimed that enforcement of the French court judgment in 
the United States would violate the First Amendment. [FN41] The U.S. district court 
agreed, holding that principles of international comity that would generally favor 
enforcing international courts' judgment against United States entities were outweighed 
by the First Amendment values at play in this case. [FN42] Because the First Amendment 
protected Yahoo!'s dissemination of anti-Semitic speech, the enforcement of the French 
court order enjoining such dissemination would violate the First Amendment. [FN43] 
 
 Yet in a surprising turn of events, shortly after securing this unprecedented 
victory for the dissemination of First Amendment protected speech over the Internet, 
Yahoo! chose to exercise its prerogative as a private regulator of Internet speech to 
prohibit the dissemination of the Nazi-related content at issue in the case. [FN44] Other 
Internet search engines and service providers also refuse to host Nazi-related and other 
controversial content, even though such speech is protected by the First Amendment 
against government censorship. [FN45] 
 
C. Congress's Encouragement of Private Internet Speech Regulation 
 
 One might suppose that the censorship of Internet speech described above would 
cause concern among those charged with protecting our First Amendment freedoms. 
Surprisingly, however, neither Congress nor the courts have looked critically upon 
speech restrictions imposed by private Internet actors. Rather, courts have rejected 
challenges to private Internet actors' speech restrictions on the grounds that such actors 
are not state actors, nor the functional equivalent of state actors, under applicable First 
Amendment doctrine. [FN46] Further, Congress, far from looking critically upon such 
"private" speech restrictions, has affirmatively encouraged Internet actors to exercise 
discretion to restrict First Amendment protected expression. 
 
 In passing the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), [FN47] Congress 
sought to remedy perceived ills caused by certain types of offensive Internet expression 
(primarily sexually-themed expression). Congress set out to remedy these speech harms 
by using two different approaches. First, the CDA prohibited the transmission of certain 
types of sexually-themed expression anywhere on the Internet. [FN48] These provisions 
were insufficiently attentive to the First Amendment rights of individuals, and were 
readily struck down by the Supreme Court. [FN49] Second, and far more successfully, 
Congress encouraged private Internet actors to do what it could not do itself-- restrict 
harmful, offensive, and otherwise undesirable speech, the expression of which would 
nonetheless be protected by the First Amendment (if restricted by a state actor). In 
Section 230 of the CDA, [FN50] Congress sought to encourage the proliferation of a free 
market in Internet speech; a market in forums for expression that would be largely 
unfettered by government intervention and defined predominantly by private actors' 
speech choices. Accordingly, Section 230 provides that: 
 
The Congress finds [that] the Internet and other interactive computer services 
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity, [and] the 
Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of 
all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation . . . . 
. . . . 
It is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive 
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation. [FN51] 
 
Recognizing the importance of the Internet as a forum for expression, Congress sought in 
this section of the CDA to advance the goal of free expression by minimizing the 
government's role in regulating Internet expression, while at the same time handing over 
the reins of regulating Internet expression to private actors. In lieu of creating an 
affirmative role for Congress in protecting free speech on the Internet, Congress chose to 
defer to private actors to regulate speech as they saw fit, to let a "free market" in 
expression and in the regulation of expression reign on the Internet. Congress sought to 
encourage ISPs and other owners of Internet speech forums to restrict expression, and 
access to expression, that the providers found undesirable. Accordingly, Section 230(c)(2) 
of the CDA provides: 
 
No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account 
of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider . . . considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected. [FN52] Through Section 230, the 
Government excised itself from the role of affirmatively protecting free 
expression on the Internet, and passed the mantle of speech regulation over to 
private entities. [FN53] 
 
Accordingly, one significant result of the government's privatization of the Internet is the 
concomitant privatization of regulation of Internet expression. What follows from such 
privatization is that today there are essentially no places on the Internet where free speech 
is constitutionally protected. Rather, such Internet speech is only protected, if at all, by 
the grace of the private entities who control the private spaces in which such speech is 
hosted. Far from the speech utopian theorists' predictions that the Internet would 
constitute a public forum in which constitutional protections for free expression were at 
their apex, today's Internet is constituted by an amalgam of private forums within which 
constitutional protection for free expression is non-existent. Furthermore, Congress 
apparently wanted it that way. 
 
D. Private Speech Regulation and the First Amendment 
 
 Like Congress, courts have consistently protected the right of private entities to 
regulate Internet speech unchecked by the First Amendment. In accordance with the 
Supreme Court's recent First Amendment jurisprudence, courts have refused to apply any 
First Amendment scrutiny to private Internet actors' restrictions of constitutionally-
protected speech. 
 
 For the first century and a half of constitutional interpretation, courts consistently 
applied the First Amendment only to speech restrictions imposed by government actors. 
In Marsh v. Alabama, [FN54] however, the Supreme Court began to discard formalistic 
distinctions between public and private regulations of speech and to carefully scrutinize 
the speech restrictions imposed by entities that wielded government-like power over 
individuals' speech. In Marsh, the Court inaugurated the "company town" doctrine, in 
which it treated a private corporation that performed certain "traditional government 
functions" as the equivalent of a state actor for First Amendment purposes. This doctrine 
was applied and extended through the 1960s, but was curtailed in several decisions in the 
1970s. [FN55] Consistent with this trend of declining to treat private speech regulators as 
state actors for First Amendment purposes, courts have declined to subject private 
Internet actors' speech restrictions to any scrutiny whatsoever under the First Amendment. 
 
1. Private Regulation of Speech in Real Space 
 
 Marsh v. Alabama involved speech regulations imposed by a "company town," a 
phenomenon of the Deep South in the early Twentieth Century, in which economically 
ailing regions encouraged capital investments by allowing corporations to build and 
operate towns. [FN56] Though privately maintained, such towns "had all the 
characteristics of any other American town," including streets, sidewalks, sewers, public 
lighting, police and fire protection, business and residential areas, churches, postal 
facilities, and schools. [FN57] The town of Chickasaw, Alabama, was one such company 
town, with "nothing to distinguish [it] from any other town and shopping center, except 
the fact that the title to the property belong[ed] to a private corporation." [FN58] The 
streets and sidewalks of the town, which under the public forum doctrine would be 
considered public forums where individuals would enjoy their strongest free speech 
rights, were privately owned and regulated. 
 
 Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, sought to distribute religious literature and 
express her religious views from a sidewalk in Chickasaw. A town official warned her 
that she could not distribute literature on the town's sidewalks or streets--or anywhere 
else in the town--without a permit, and that no permit would be issued to her. Marsh was 
asked to leave the sidewalk and the town, but she refused to do so. She was subsequently 
arrested and charged with violating state trespass law. [FN59] 
 
 Marsh claimed that the application of the state trespass law under these 
circumstances would unconstitutionally abridge her First Amendment rights. [FN60] The 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the town's private status did not insulate its 
regulations of speech from First Amendment scrutiny. In extending the First 
Amendment's protections to private regulations of speech, the Court emphasized the fact 
that the streets, sidewalks, and other places within the town that would be categorized as 
public forums if owned by the state, were "accessible to and freely used by the public in 
general," and generally served the same functions as such places serve when publicly 
owned. [FN61] The Court looked beyond the formalistic public/private distinction and 
held that, despite the fact that such places were privately owned, they were "built and 
operated primarily to benefit the public" and "their operation is essentially a public 
function." [FN62] Because such property was open to the public and because the public 
had an interest in keeping the channels of communication open and uncensored to enable 
the public to make well-informed decisions as members of a self-governing democracy, 
even private restrictions on speech within such forums were subject to scrutiny. [FN63] 
Marsh therefore places primacy on the government's affirmative obligations under the 
First Amendment to establish and protect the pre-conditions of democratic self-
government. [FN64] As the Court explained, to participate in democratic self-government, 
individuals must have access to uncensored information and open channels of 
communication. For the purposes of advancing this goal, it does not matter whether the 
restrictions on speech are imposed by private property owners or by the government as a 
property owner. Rather, the dispositive inquiry is whether the speech regulation interferes 
with the channels of communication essential for individuals to participate meaningfully 
in democratic self-government. 
 
 The Marsh Court's rejection of the public/private distinction was carried forward 
in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. [FN65] 
Logan Valley involved the picketing of Weis Market, a non-union supermarket located 
within a privately-owned shopping center on privately-owned property adjacent to the 
shopping center. The shopping center had no publicly-owned sidewalks or streets 
adjacent to the targeted supermarket, and so the picketers' only effective option was to 
stage their picket on private property adjacent to the supermarket. [FN66] Members of 
the Amalgamated Food Employees Union picketed Weis by carrying (truthful) signs 
stating that the supermarket was non-union and that its employees did not receive union 
wages or benefits. [FN67] The picket was staged in the privately-owned areas where the 
supermarket's customers would pick up their groceries and the adjacent portion of the 
parking lot. [FN68] The picketers selected this location so as to effectively convey their 
message to Weis managers, employees, and customers. In response to the picketing, the 
owners of the supermarket and of the shopping center instituted an action to enjoin the 
picketing. The lower courts granted an injunction prohibiting such expression, finding 
that the picketing constituted a trespass on private property not privileged by the First 
Amendment. [FN69] 
 
 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court first compared the features and 
characteristics of the places where the picketing occurred to the place where the 
expressive activity involved in Marsh occurred, and found them to be functionally similar 
for purposes of the First Amendment inquiry. [FN70] The Court explained, "[w]e see no 
reason why access to a business district in a company town for the purpose of exercising 
First Amendment rights should be constitutionally required, while access for the same 
purpose to property functioning as a business-district should be limited . . . ." [FN71] 
Because the Logan Valley shopping center enjoyed the same features as the sidewalks in 
Marsh and public forums like sidewalks and streets, regulations of speech on such private 
property was subject to First Amendment scrutiny. [FN72] 
 
 Because the picketers sought to exercise their free speech rights "in a manner and 
for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the [private property at issue was] 
actually put," the Court held that the First Amendment precluded the private property 
owners from enjoining such expression. [FN73] As in the Marsh decision, the Court in 
Logan Valley looked to the functional characteristics of the property at issue, instead of 
to the formalistic distinction between public and private ownership of such property, in 
determining whether and how to protect free speech values within such property. In so 
doing, the Court properly looked to the characteristics of the property on which the 
speech regulation occurred, the functional similarities between such private forums and 
public forums, the openness of the property to the public, and the suitability of such 
property for expressive purposes, instead of simply to whether the property was held 
privately or publicly. 
 
 Marsh and Logan Valley represent the high water mark of the Court's treatment of 
private speech regulators as state actors for First Amendment purposes. Shortly after the 
Logan Valley decision, the Supreme Court scaled back its protection of free speech 
against private speech regulation in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner. [FN74] Lloyd involved 
individuals' efforts to distribute leaflets and other materials to protest the Vietnam War 
within the privately-owned property of Lloyd Center, a large shopping mall complex. 
[FN75] Lloyd Center encompassed approximately fifty acres and contained sixty 
establishments, including offices of doctors, dentists, lawyers, bankers, travel agents, and 
persons offering a variety of other services. [FN76] The private entities who acquired 
Lloyd Center purchased the land from the city of Portland, which vacated acres of public 
streets and other public land to make room for the shopping mall complex. Given the 
extent of goods and services available at the shopping center complex, as well as its 
central location, "for many Portland citizens, Lloyd Center [would] so completely satisfy 
their wants that they would have no reason to go elsewhere for goods or services." [FN77] 
Indeed, as a testament to the Center's potential for reaching broad general audiences, 
presidential candidates from both major parties selected the Lloyd Center as the forum 
from which to reach the broadest audience of Portland residents. [FN78] Recognizing the 
Center's potential for reaching a broad cross-section of Portland citizens, several anti-war 
protestors sought to distribute anti-war materials from within the mall's walkways. [FN79] 
The owners of the complex instructed their security guards to warn the protestors that 
they would be arrested unless they ceased their expressive activities on the mall's private 
property. [FN80] The protestors brought suit against the mall owners, claiming that the 
First Amendment privileged their expressive activities. 
 
 The Supreme Court held that the protestors did not enjoy the First Amendment 
right to express themselves on the mall's private property. The Court distinguished Logan 
Valley by explaining that the picketers in Logan Valley were expressing themselves on a 
subject matter that was directly related to the shopping center's operations--the non-union 
nature of the Weis supermarket--in circumstances in which there were "no other 
reasonable opportunities for the picketers to convey their message to their intended 
audience were available." [FN81] In contrast, the Court explained, the protestors in Lloyd 
were not protesting on a matter related to the shopping center's operations, [FN82] and 
the protestors had reasonable alternative opportunities to convey their message to their 
intended audiences, such as by distributing their literature on the public streets and 
sidewalks adjacent to Lloyd Center. [FN83] 
 
 Notwithstanding the Court's attempts to distinguish these earlier cases 
meaningfully, it is difficult to explain the Court's movement from Logan Valley to Lloyd 
as anything other than a deliberate doctrinal shift to insulate private speech regulation 
from First Amendment scrutiny. The Court's subsequent First Amendment state action 
cases, including Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, [FN84] more definitively 
narrowed the exceptions left open by Lloyd to all but preclude First Amendment 
protection for speech subject to regulation by private actors. 
 
2. Private Regulation of Speech in Cyberspace 
 
 Individuals whose speech has been restricted by private Internet actors have 
sought to extend the state action doctrine as articulated in Marsh and Logan Valley (and 
subsequently honed in Lloyd) to private Internet actors, and have attempted to subject 
such online speech regulations to First Amendment scrutiny. These lawsuits involve 
challenges to Internet actors' refusal to deliver e-mails, removal of content posted on 
websites, and termination of individuals' accounts as a penalty for speech infractions. 
Several of these cases involve Cyber Promotions, Inc., a company specializing in the 
dissemination of unsolicited e-mail. In Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 
[FN85] Cyber Promotions sought an injunction to prevent AOL from blocking messages 
it was attempting to send to AOL e-mail addresses. Cyber Promotions argued that AOL 
had opened its network to the public and devoted a portion of its property to public use 
by providing Internet e-mail services and acting as the sole conduit to its members' 
Internet e-mail boxes. [FN86] Cyber Promotions concluded that AOL had thereby 
effectively established a public forum in which its speech regulations were subject to 
First Amendment scrutiny. [FN87] 
 
 In analyzing whether AOL was a state actor for purposes of the First Amendment, 
the district court adopted a three-factor state action analysis gleaned from earlier Supreme 
Court cases, which required it to consider (1) whether AOL assumed a "traditional public 
function" in undertaking to perform the conduct at issue; (2) whether an elaborate 
financial or regulatory nexus existed between AOL's challenged conduct and the state; 
and/or (3) whether a symbiotic relationship existed between AOL and the state. [FN88] 
As to whether AOL "has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative 
of the state," the court answered in the negative, resting its analysis in part on the 
(simplistic) observation that the provision of access to the Internet through an e-mail 
system did not constitute the exercise of a public service traditionally exercised by the 
state. [FN89] 
 
 Regarding the "exclusive public function" prong of the state action test, the court 
once again readily concluded that AOL's provisions of e-mail service to its subscribers 
did not constitute a traditional exclusive public function. [FN90] In contrast with the 
private property owner in Marsh, in which "the owner of the company town was 
performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State," 
[FN91] AOL exercised no powers that were the exclusive prerogative of the State. Cyber 
Promotions contested this point, citing Logan Valley and Lloyd and arguing that AOL's 
provision of Internet e-mail service constituted an exclusive public function because there 
were no alternative avenues of communication available to Cyber Promotions to 
disseminate its message to AOL members via e-mail. [FN92] The court rejected this 
argument, finding that Cyber Promotions had other means available to reach AOL 
members, including U.S. mail, telemarketing, television, cable, newspapers, magazines, 
and leafleting. [FN93] The Cyber Promotions court thus essentially concluded that the 
only alternative avenues of expression for Cyber Promotions to reach its desired audience 
of AOL members would be non-Internet channels. 
 
 The Supreme Court has recently clarified that (at least when the government is 
regulating) the relevant constitutional inquiry is whether the speech regulation at issue 
leaves open alternative avenues of expression within the speaker's chosen medium of 
expression. This issue was confronted by the Court in the Reno v. ACLU decision, [FN94] 
in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting "indecent" and 
"patently offensive" communications on the Internet. [FN95] Part of the government's 
argument for the statute's constitutionality was that, even though the statute proscribed 
certain types of speech on the Internet, there were ample real space avenues of 
communication available for speakers. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
explaining that it would foreclose an entire medium of communication from 
constitutional protection. [FN96] To assess properly whether alternative avenues of 
expression exist for purposes of determining whether to subject private speech regulation 
to First Amendment scrutiny, courts should look to whether there are adequate alternative 
avenues of communication within the Internet medium itself for the speaker to 
communicate her message. If the speech regulation at issue fails to leave open such 
avenues on the Internet, the regulation--whether imposed by public or private hands-- 
should be held to fail First Amendment scrutiny. [FN97] 
 
 In short, the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that the 
relevant inquiry into "adequate alternative means of expression" turns on whether such 
alternative means exist within the speaker's chosen medium of expression. To conduct the 
inquiry otherwise would be tantamount to foreclosing an entire medium of expression to 
the speaker. Because the Cyber Promotions court looked to non-Internet media to 
conclude that alternative avenues of expression existed for Cyber Promotions to reach its 
intended audience, its analysis was flawed. 
 
 The application of the state action doctrine to subject private Internet speech 
regulation to First Amendment scrutiny has been rejected in other contexts as well. In 
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, Kenneth Hamidi, a disgruntled former employee of Intel, sent a 
series of e-mails critical of Intel's employment practices to several thousand Intel 
employees using their Intel e-mail addresses. [FN98] Intel, not wanting its employees to 
receive critical information about it, asserted its private property rights in its e-mail 
servers, and claimed that Hamidi, by sending such e-mails, was trespassing upon its 
personal property. [FN99] Among his other defenses, Hamidi asserted a First 
Amendment defense, claiming that he had a free speech right to send such an e-mail and 
that Intel's maintenance of an e-mail system connected to the Internet subjected Intel's 
speech regulations to First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
 The lower court rejected Hamidi's First Amendment defense to Intel's trespass to 
chattels claim, holding that Intel's e-mail servers were its private property and that "Intel 
is as much entitled to control its e-mail system as it is to guard its factories and 
hallways." [FN100] Although Hamidi ultimately prevailed on property law grounds, 
[FN101] the First Amendment issues in this case merit closer inspection. [FN102] In 
particular, the analysis of Hamidi's First Amendment claims by the Justices of the 
California Supreme Court reveal some common misperceptions regarding channels of 
communication that are available for individuals to express themselves on the Internet. 
Judge Mosk in his dissenting opinion, for example, took pains to criticize Hamidi's First 
Amendment defense on the grounds that Hamidi's expression occurred on a "private, 
proprietary intranet," and not within "the public commons of the Internet." [FN103] Mosk 
further explained, "Hamidi is not communicating in the equivalent of a town square or 
a . . . mailing through the United States Postal Service [but is rather] crossing from the 
public Internet into a private intranet." [FN104] 
 
 Justice Mosk's analysis embodies a common misperception about the existence of 
public spaces and forums on the Internet--that there exists some sort of "public commons 
on the Internet" and indeed that the functional "equivalent of a town square" exists 
somewhere on the Internet. If Hamidi had gone there to express his message, Mosk 
suggests, his speech would have been protected by the First Amendment. The problem, 
however, is that there is no there there. Given the government's retreat from ownership 
and control of the Internet's infrastructure and the component spaces of the Internet, and 
given the overwhelming private ownership of expressive forums on the Internet, no such 
"public commons" or "town square" equivalents exist. Virtually all speech on the Internet 
is subject to the same type of private regulation as Intel's "private, proprietary intranet." 
In the same way that Intel's speech regulations on its servers are immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny, so too are other regulations of speech at the hands of private 
entities. 
 
 In addition to ceding control over the forums for speech to private entities, the 
U.S. government has ceded control over certain gateways for expression to private 
entities. As I explore at greater length elsewhere, [FN105] the government in 1998 ceded 
control over the Internet domain name system [FN106] to a nominally private entity, the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Domain names are the 
names that uniquely correspond to Internet protocol addresses assigned to computers to 
enable them to be connected to the Internet. Management of the domain name system 
translates into management of the gateways of communication via the Internet. 
 
 Prior to transferring control of the domain name system to ICANN, the United 
States vested a private corporation, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), with exclusive control 
over the registration of domain names. NSI, in turn, exercised this control by refusing to 
register certain domain names that it deemed inappropriate. [FN107] Its refusal to register 
certain domain names was challenged in several instances by the entities seeking to use 
such domain names. In one such case, an brought suit challenging NSI's refusal to 
register certain domain names containing sexually-themed words protected by the First 
Amendment. The disappointed domain name registrant, Island Online, claimed that NSI 
was a state actor and that NSI's refusal to register constitutionally-protected terms as 
domain names violated the First Amendment. [FN108] The court rejected Island Online's 
First Amendment claims, holding, inter alia, that the function of registering domain 
names did not constitute an "exclusive public function" and therefore the performance of 
this function did not render NSI a state actor. Relying once again on the fact that Internet-
related functions are not in any sense "traditional" public functions, the court explained: 
 
Although the [U.S. government] was an instrumental agent in the Internet's 
origins, the Internet is by no stretch of the imagination a traditional and exclusive 
public function. For most of its history, its growth and development have been 
nurtured by and realized through private action. Moreover, registration of Internet 
domain names, the focal point of this case, has never been a public function at all. 
[FN109] 
 
The court accordingly rejected Island Online's argument that NSI's conduct satisfied the 
exclusive public function test--or any of the other tests--for establishing that NSI's 
speech-restrictive actions constituted state action. It therefore concluded that NSI's 
content-based domain name registration policy was "purely private conduct" that was 
immune from scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
 
 The court in National A-1 Advertising Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc. further 
analyzed whether NSI's speech-restrictive decisions were subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny. [FN110] In that case, NSI once again refused to register as domain names 
certain sexually-oriented (but First Amendment-protected) terms. The court first 
considered and rejected the argument that NSI was a state actor because it was 
performing a traditional state function by registering Internet domain names. Undertaking 
a more sophisticated analysis than the Island Online court, this court observed that 
although the "tradition" of serving as a registrar of domain names was not a long one, it 
was indeed one that had been performed and overseen by the government since the 
Internet's inception. [FN111] The court stated, however, that mere performance of a 
public function by itself was insufficient to qualify an entity as a state actor; rather, it 
must be further shown that the function is one that is exclusively reserved by the state. 
[FN112] This test, the court explained, is designed to "flush out a state's attempt to evade 
its responsibilities by delegating them to private entities." [FN113] The court held that 
NSI failed this portion of the test for establishing state action. The court went on to hold 
that NSI did not satisfy the second prong of the state action test because the government 
did not exercise coercive power or provide encouragement such that the actions at issue 
(that is, the refusal to register the desired domain names) could be deemed to be the 
conduct of the government. [FN114] Finally, the court concluded that NSI failed the third 
prong of the state action test because the relationship between the government and NSI 
could not properly be viewed as "symbiotic." [FN115] Notwithstanding the existence of a 
cooperative agreement between the government and NSI regarding NSI's role as a 
domain name registrar, the court found that the government was not fairly considered a 
"joint participant" in the challenged conduct. 
 
 NSI defended its conduct in the above cases not only on the grounds that it was a 
private actor and that its speech-restrictive decisions were therefore immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny, but also on the grounds that as a private actor it enjoyed the right 
not to sponsor (or be compelled to express) speech with which it disagreed. [FN116] 
Indeed, private Internet entities like NSI have increasingly wielded the First Amendment 
not only as a shield to insulate themselves from First Amendment liability for their 
speech regulations, but also as a sword to claim First Amendment protection as speakers 
and publishers for their exercise of "editorial" discretion. Invoking a line of cases 
beginning with Miami Herald v. Tornillo, [FN117] in which the Supreme Court upheld a 
newspaper's right not to be compelled to publish right-of-reply speech that was not of its 
choosing, private Internet actors like NSI have asserted that their content-based decisions 
are in furtherance of their First Amendment rights as speakers and publishers. [FN118] 
 
 In Island Online, NSI claimed that it "has a right founded in the First Amendment 
of the Constitution to refuse to register, and thereby publish, . . . words that it deems to be 
inappropriate [because under the First Amendment] no corporation can be compelled to 
engage in publication which the corporation finds to be inappropriate." [FN119] This 
First Amendment argument has been wielded in contexts far afield from its original 
domain of protecting speakers and publishers from being compelled to adopt speech with 
which they disagree. For example, Internet pipeline providers have successfully asserted 
this First Amendment argument to fend off governmental attempts to provide competitors 
with equal access to their pipelines. In Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. 
Broward County, Comcast challenged the county's "equal access" regulation, which 
required cable television systems offering high-speed Internet service to allow 
competitors equal access to their broadband systems. [FN120] Comcast successfully 
argued that, like publishers and speakers, it enjoyed editorial discretion over its 
programming and that the government requirement of equal (or "forced") access would 
violate its First Amendment rights to host only the content of its choosing. [FN121] 
Accordingly, the First Amendment has not only insulated private speech regulators from 
First Amendment scrutiny; it has also affirmatively protected their "editorial" decisions 
regarding which content to publish within their Internet places. 
 
 In sum, courts have resoundingly concluded that private entities' regulation of 
speech on the Internet does not constitute state action and that such private speech 
regulation is wholly immune from First Amendment scrutiny. Consistent with Congress's 
intent (as embodied in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act) to turn the reins 
of Internet speech regulation over to private entities, private Internet actors have been 
allowed to wield substantial control over Internet expression, wholly unchecked by the 
First Amendment. 
 
III. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF SPEECH FORUMS AND THE PUBLIC FORUM 
DOCTRINE 
 
A. Negative Versus Affirmative Conceptions of the First Amendment 
 
 The Internet indeed provides an unprecedented forum--or more accurately, an 
amalgam of forums--for expression. The overwhelming majority of these forums, 
however, are private, and accordingly, decisions regarding speech regulation are wholly 
immune from First Amendment scrutiny. Moreover, as will be discussed in Part V, even 
the comparatively insignificant publicly-owned forums for Internet speech have not been 
held to the stringent First Amendment standards applicable to speech regulations within 
genuine public forums. 
 
 According to one theory of Internet speech--the Net libertarian school that 
informed the privatization of the Internet in the first place--it is this very privatization of 
speech forums that best advances free speech values on the Internet. Net libertarians, 
such as Professor Richard Epstein, [FN122] claim that the primary purpose of the First 
Amendment is to insulate private individuals' speech decisions from government 
interference. Accordingly, such theorists claim that a free market for speech and for 
regulations of speech fully and completely serves the goals of freedom of expression, 
absent any government involvement to protect speech. Under this Net libertarian view, if 
there are low barriers to entry in the speech market, then the speech-protective goals of 
the First Amendment will be perfectly advanced by the aggregation of private forums and 
private speech decisions within these forums. [FN123] Affirmative government 
involvement in the market for speech in general--and in creating and maintaining public 
forums for speech in particular--will be unnecessary. 
 
 A competing school of thought conceptualizes the First Amendment as 
encompassing an affirmative, speech-protective role for the government, beyond the 
negative role of strictly scrutinizing governmental regulation of speech. According to this 
affirmative conception, the free speech values embodied in the First Amendment cannot 
be advanced solely by allowing private property owners free rein to determine what 
speech to permit and what speech to restrict within their property. As Cass Sunstein 
contends, a well-functioning system of free expression "is not intended to aggregate 
existing private preferences," but rather must incorporate certain collective values, values 
that will not necessarily be realized in an unregulated market for speech. [FN124] 
Sunstein explains that a free market for free speech could generate a range of serious 
problems. If the allocation of speech rights was decided through an ordinary pricing 
system, such a system would fail to incorporate certain speech-regarding values, and 
would ensure that dissident and other disfavored or unpopular speech would be 
foreclosed. [FN125] The affirmative conception of the First Amendment requires the 
government's involvement in the market for free speech to establish conditions allowing 
each citizen to exercise meaningfully his or her right to freedom of expression, a right 
that is integral to our system of democratic self-government. In the words of Professor 
Laurence Tribe, another advocate of the affirmative conception of the First Amendment, 
"it is not enough for the government to refrain from invading certain areas of liberty. The 
State may, even at some cost to the public fisc, be required to provide at least a minimally 
adequate opportunity for the exercise of certain freedoms." [FN126] 
 
B. The Public Forum Doctrine 
1. Development of the Doctrine 
 
 This affirmative conception of the First Amendment finds its clearest judicial 
expression in the development of the public forum doctrine, [FN127] under which courts 
impose on the government the affirmative obligation to dedicate certain publicly-held 
property for the use and benefit of individuals seeking to exercise their free speech rights. 
Prior to Hague v. CIO, [FN128] in which the Supreme Court first adopted the public 
forum doctrine, the government as a property owner enjoyed the same unfettered 
discretion as private property owners to regulate speech on its property. The Supreme 
Court articulated this position in Davis v. Massachusetts. [FN129] Davis involved a First 
Amendment challenge to government-imposed speech regulations on the (publicly-
owned) Boston Common. The Court rejected this constitutional challenge and held that 
"there was no right in the plaintiff. . . to use the common except in such mode and subject 
to such regulations as the legislature in its wisdom may have deemed proper to 
prescribe." [FN130] Accordingly, prior to the Supreme Court's adoption of the public 
forum doctrine, the government as private property owner enjoyed unfettered discretion 
to restrict speech on its property, free from any First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
 In Hague v. CIO, the Supreme Court rejected the approach articulated in Davis 
and held that the government did not enjoy the same unfettered discretion as a private 
property owner to regulate speech on its property. [FN131] Rather, the Court imposed on 
the government the requirement that it accord the widest possible latitude to speech 
within property that constituted a "public forum" such as public parks, sidewalks, and 
streets. [FN132] These public forums are the places in which individuals are guaranteed 
not just the right but the meaningful opportunity to express themselves. Accordingly, 
under the public forum doctrine, the government serves as the guarantor of citizens' free 
speech rights. 
 
 Not all government-owned property enjoys public forum status. Property such as 
offices within government-owned office buildings, state prisons, and the like are not held 
open by the government for members of the public for expressive purposes. [FN133] But, 
within government-owned property that is deemed a "public forum," all speakers are 
permitted to express themselves on whatever viewpoints and whatever subjects they 
choose (as long as those subjects fall within the general parameters of speech for which 
the forum was designated). [FN134] It is within these public forums that speakers enjoy 
the fullest and broadest First Amendment protection. Thus, within public forums, the 
government must permit all manner of speech within the scope of the First Amendment's 
protection, regardless of the speakers' viewpoint or the content of such speech. [FN135] 
Government restrictions on speech within such forums are also subject to the strictest 
judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the ability to express oneself within a public forum--where 
regulation of the viewpoint or content of speech is substantially prohibited [FN136]--is 
among the most important components of the First Amendment's protection for free 
speech. As Stephen Gey explains: 
 
The public forum doctrine . . . derives from the most basic mythological image of 
free speech: an agitated but eloquent speaker standing on a soap box at Speakers' 
Corner, railing against injustices committed by the government, whose agents are 
powerless to keep the audience from hearing the speaker's damning word. . . . . 
 . . . . 
. . . [T]he essential reality grasped by the public forum doctrine remains as valid 
today as it was when thousands of Socialists packed into Union Square in the 
early days of [the twentieth] century to hang on every word of great progressive 
orators such as Eugene Debs. The larger reality behind the myth of the debate on 
the public street-corner is that every culture must have venues in which citizens 
can confront each other's ideas and ways of thinking about the world. Without 
such a place, a pluralistic culture inevitably becomes Balkanized into factions that 
not only cannot come to agreement about the Common Good, but also will not 
even know enough about other subcultures within the society to engage 
effectively in the deal-making and horse-trading that is the key to every modern 
manifestation of democratic government. [FN137] Thus, while private property 
owners enjoy unfettered discretion to regulate or censor speech on any grounds 
whatsoever, under the public forum doctrine, government actors are substantially 
restrained in their ability to regulate speech within their "property" when that 
property constitutes a public forum. 
 
 In sum, in its foundational public forum decisions, the Supreme Court made clear 
that streets, sidewalks, parks, and similar places that are open to the public and conducive 
to open and free expression are to be dedicated to the public as forums for individuals to 
exercise their free speech rights. In real space, the requirement imposed upon the 
government to preserve such places for free and open expression serves as a critical 
safeguard of First Amendment rights. Absent the public forum doctrine, individuals 
would be restricted to expressing themselves on their own private property or on property 
owned by others only if they could convince these other property owners to permit such 
speech on their property. 
 
 The existence of public forums ameliorates the effect of economic disparities in 
property ownership upon individuals' right to free speech. Along these lines, the Supreme 
Court has demonstrated special solicitude in its public forum jurisprudence for the free 
speech rights of poorly-financed speakers and causes. [FN138] The public forum doctrine 
imposes upon the government the obligation to facilitate and subsidize the speech of 
poorly-financed speakers, by granting them an effective forum from which to express 
themselves. [FN139] 
 
 Given that property in real space generally consists of a mix of public and private 
forums, and given that most places in the United States contain centrally-located public 
forums like public streets and parks, in real space all speakers--however poorly financed 
or unpopular their cause--are guaranteed an effective, centrally-located forum from which 
to express their views and to reach a broad general audience. Accordingly, the mandate 
that the government dedicate such centrally-located public places to the public for free 
speech purposes provides a crucial safety valve for free expression. By granting poorly-
financed and unpropertied speakers access to centrally located public property, public 
forums enable individuals to express themselves effectively to broad audiences. 
The required existence of public forums advances free speech interests in another 
important manner. By granting speakers access to interstitial public forums--such as 
streets and sidewalks located adjacent to private property--public forums enable 
individuals effectively to target specific private property owners. Interstitial public 
forums serve a different purpose than centrally-located public forums like parks. 
Interstitial public forums enable individuals to target specific private property owners by 
providing a forum from which individuals can address the precise targets of their speech. 
[FN140] For example, individuals who wish to criticize a company's employment 
practices are ensured the right under the public forum doctrine to protest on the public 
streets and sidewalks adjacent to that company's headquarters. Absent such interstitial 
public forums, individuals could not effectively criticize private property owners because 
the targeted entities would refuse to allow speech critical of them on or near their 
property. Given the characteristics of our real space landscape, individuals accessing 
private property must generally pass through interstitial public forums and along the way 
may be subject to hearing speech that they might otherwise choose to avoid. The 
existence of interstitial public forums requires listeners to be confronted with expression 
that they might otherwise choose to avoid and prevents individuals from exercising 
perfect control over which expression will reach them. [FN141] If an individual chooses 
to shop at a non-union grocery store, and desires to insulate herself from criticisms of the 
store's employment practices, for example, the existence of interstitial public forums 
requires that the individual be confronted with such speech nonetheless. [FN142] 
 
 In short, public forums (and public ownership of property, the prerequisite for 
public forums) serve important roles in facilitating freedom of expression in real space. 
The existence of publicly-owned property and the scrutiny imposed on regulations of 
speech within such property are critical to the protection of First Amendment rights. 
 
 2. Categorization of Forums 
Although the justifications for public forums and the role public forums play in our 
democratic system are compelling and straightforward, the development of the public 
forum doctrine has become quite complex in recent years. Since the inception of this 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has rendered the doctrine intricate, complex, and rather 
convoluted. While this Article primarily analyzes the roles that so-called traditional 
public forums like streets, sidewalks, and parks serve within our system of democratic 
self-government, a brief foray into the Court's complex, trifurcated analysis of 
government-owned forums may prove helpful. This case law breaks out forums into the 
following three categories: (1) traditional public forums; (2) designated public forums; 
and (3) non-public forums. 
 
 "Traditional" public forums consist of streets, sidewalks, parks, and other places 
that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions." [FN143] "Designated public forums" consist of public 
property that has not "immemorially" been used as a forum for expression, but which the 
government has explicitly opened and designated as a place for expressive activity by the 
public. [FN144] The government may choose, for example, to open up property within a 
public school, [FN145] university meeting facilities [FN146] or municipal theaters, 
[FN147] as forums for expression generally or for expression on certain designated 
subjects. Within a limited-purpose designated public forum, once the government has 
defined the subject matter limitations of the forum, regulation of such property is subject 
to the same limitations as those governing a traditional public forum. [FN148] Thus, both 
within traditional public forums and designated public forums, individuals enjoy their 
most robust rights of free expression. Government restrictions on speech within such 
public forums are subject to the most stringent scrutiny under the First Amendment such 
that no speech restrictions will be upheld unless they serve compelling government 
interests and are the least restrictive means of restricting such speech. 
 
 The third category of publicly-owned forums is non-public forums: places like 
military bases, jail grounds, and federal workplaces, that the government owns but which 
it has not opened up for expressive activity on the part of the public. [FN149] 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that, to constitute a public forum, the 
place in which speech occurs need not be an actual physical place. Rather, public forums 
may also include virtual forums, like funding and solicitation schemes, [FN150] the 
airwaves, [FN151] and cable television. [FN152] 
  
 The classification of a forum into one type of forum or another is all but 
dispositive of the First Amendment challenge. If a forum is deemed to fall within the 
traditional or designated public forum category, courts will apply strict scrutiny to 
content-based regulations of speech within the forum and will almost certainly strike 
down such regulations. Regulations of speech within a non-public forum, on the other 
hand, are subject to reduced scrutiny and will most likely withstand constitutional 
challenge. How courts classify speech forums on the Internet thus becomes a critical 
factor in the extension of First Amendment protections to speech in cyberspace. 
 
IV. COURTS' REFUSAL TO SUBJECT PUBLIC INTERNET ACTORS TO 
STRINGENT FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS 
  
 Public forums embody the government's guarantee that citizens will enjoy 
meaningful free speech rights. Yet, as we have also seen, the vast majority of speech 
forums in cyberspace are privately owned and privately regulated, with the consequence 
that virtually no public forums exist, and speech regulations within private forums are 
immune from First Amendment scrutiny. A small fraction of Internet forums for speech, 
however, are government-owned. One might suppose that such publicly-owned Internet 
spaces would be deemed public forums: places where individuals could enjoy their free 
speech rights most fully and the constitutional guarantee of free expression could be 
rendered meaningful. 
 
 In several recent challenges to speech regulations imposed by government within 
public Internet spaces, however, courts--including the Supreme Court-- have concluded 
that such spaces are not public forums and that therefore governmental regulation of 
speech within these forums are immune from meaningful First Amendment scrutiny. 
Most notably, in United States v. American Library Ass'n, [FN153] the Supreme Court 
held that Internet access provided by public libraries did not constitute a public forum, 
and that speech restrictions imposed within such forums were therefore immune from 
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
 In American Library Ass'n, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the 
Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which required that all public libraries that 
provide Internet access to their patrons must impose software filters upon such access, or 
else forgo substantial federal funding. [FN154] CIPA makes the use of software filters by 
public libraries and schools a condition on their receipt of two kinds of federal subsidies: 
grants under the Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) [FN155] and "E-rate" 
discounts for Internet access and support under the Telecommunications Act. [FN156] To 
receive LSTA funds or E-rate discounts, CIPA essentially requires public libraries and 
schools to certify that they are using "technology protection measures" that prevent 
patrons from accessing visual depictions that are "obscene," "child pornography," or in 
the case of minors, "harmful to minors." [FN157] While CIPA's scheme allows library 
officials under certain circumstances to disable software filters for certain patrons 
engaged in bona fide research or other lawful purposes, the disabling of such filters on 
computers used by minors is prohibited if the library or school receives E-rate discounts. 
[FN158] In challenging CIPA's constitutionality, the American Library Association 
claimed that the required software filters imposed unconstitutional restrictions on their 
patrons' access to protected speech. 
 
 To understand the speech restrictions at issue in CIPA, it is important to 
understand the mechanics of software filtering. [FN159] Software filtering programs 
generally operate by comparing website addresses that a user wishes to access against a 
"blacklist." A typical filtering software program operates by examining various parts of 
an Internet address, or URL, against this internal blacklist to see if the URL is forbidden. 
[FN160] Prohibited sites may also be compared against separate exception lists or 
"whitelists." Some types of filtering software can be set so that everything not prohibited 
is permitted (blacklist only) or only that which is explicitly allowed is permitted 
(whitelist only). The software can also be designed to operate via some combination of 
blacklists and whitelists, with one list overriding another. [FN161] 
 
 The default blacklists and whitelists used by filtering software programs are 
created by those who design such software and constitute a substantial portion of the 
programs' value to consumers. As such, these lists are typically protected as trade secrets. 
Although the library may choose to configure the filtering software to filter out certain 
pre-defined categories of websites (such as "Adult/Sexually Explicit"), the library has no 
way of knowing the criteria used by the software developers to select which websites fall 
into this category, nor which websites will actually be found to fall within this category. 
Thus, a library implementing a filtering software program has no way of knowing which 
websites will actually be rendered inaccessible by the filtering software program. 
 
 The constitutional challenge to CIPA was first heard by a special three-judge 
panel, which struck down the statute after a thorough analysis of the application of the 
public forum doctrine to the circumstances presented by this case. The court explained 
that under the public forum doctrine, "the extent to which the First Amendment permits 
the government to restrict speech on its own property depends on the character of the 
forum the government has created." [FN162] The threshold determination was whether 
libraries' provision of Internet access constituted a traditional public forum, a designated 
public forum of some type, or a non-public forum. [FN163] Because the category of 
traditional public forums appears to be limited to streets, sidewalks, public parks, and 
other such public places that have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public" for expressive purposes, [FN164] the court concluded that libraries' provision of 
Internet access did not fall within this category. 
 
 The court was then required to determine whether libraries' provision of Internet 
access constituted a "designated public forum," in which case the speech restrictions 
would be subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny, or a non-public forum, in which 
case strict scrutiny would not apply. The court distinguished libraries' provision of 
Internet access from other types of non-public forums (including military bases, jail 
grounds, and the federal workplace) [FN165] and found that the purpose of a public 
library's provision of Internet access is "for use by the public . . . for expressive activity, 
namely, the dissemination and receipt by the public of a wide range of information." 
[FN166] Accordingly, the court concluded that the government's provision of Internet 
access in a public library constituted a designated public forum. [FN167] 
 
 The court next considered the level of First Amendment scrutiny that was 
applicable to the speech regulations CIPA imposed within this designated public forum. 
It explained that if a very narrow range of speech was facilitated in the first place within 
the designated limited-purpose public forum at issue, then the government's restrictions 
of speech within such a forum would be accorded substantial deference. [FN168] As the 
Supreme Court explained by way of example on the related subject of government- 
subsidized speech, "[w]hen Congress established the National Endowment for 
Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not 
constitutionally required to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as 
communism and fascism." [FN169] Rather, only speech that was within the scope for 
which the forum was designated was permitted within that forum, and speech that fell 
outside of this designated range could be constitutionally excluded by the government. 
Conversely, the broader the range of speech the government facilitates within a 
designated public forum, the less deference the First Amendment accords to the 
government's content-based restrictions on the speech within that forum. Thus, "where 
the government creates a designated public forum to facilitate private speech representing 
a diverse range of viewpoints, the government's decision selectively to single out 
particular viewpoints for exclusion is subject to strict scrutiny." [FN170] The court 
concluded that libraries' provision of Internet access fell within the latter category of 
designated public forums--that is, those in which a broad range of expression was 
permitted and, concomitantly, those in which the government's speech regulations are 
subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny. 
 
 Adverting to the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the University of Virginia, [FN171] the district court in American Library Ass'n 
explained:  
 
[T]he more widely the state opens a forum for members of the public to speak on 
a variety of subjects and viewpoints, the more vulnerable is the state's decision 
selectively to exclude certain speech on the basis of its disfavored content, as such 
exclusions distort the marketplace of ideas that the state has created in 
establishing the forum. 
. . . [W]here the state designates a forum for expressive activity and opens the 
forum for speech by the public at large on a wide range of topics, strict scrutiny 
applies to restrictions that single out for exclusion from the forum particular 
speech whose content is disfavored. . . . 
. . . [T]o the extent that the government creates a public forum expressly designed 
to facilitate the dissemination of private speech, opens the forum to any member 
of the public to speak on virtually any topic, and then selectively targets certain 
speech for exclusion based on its content, the government is singling out speech 
in a manner that . . . [is subject to] heightened First Amendment scrutiny. . . . 
[FN172] 
  
 Applying the Rosenberger Court's analysis, the court explained that libraries' 
provision of Internet access to their patrons, unlike their provision of print materials, 
enables their patrons to receive speech on a "virtually unlimited number of topics, from a 
virtually unlimited number of speakers, without attempting to restrict patrons' access to 
speech that the library, in the exercise of its professional judgment, determines to be 
particularly valuable." [FN173] Because the libraries' provision of Internet access enables 
patrons to receive speech on a broad and diverse range of topics, the restrictions on 
sexually-themed expression imposed by mandatory software filters were subject to strict 
First Amendment scrutiny. Accordingly, the court found that the use of filtering software 
mandated by CIPA erroneously blocked a huge amount of speech that is protected by the 
First Amendment, [FN174] estimating the number of web pages erroneously blocked to 
be "at least tens of thousands." [FN175] The court observed that the government's expert 
himself found that popular filtering software packages overblock at rates between 6% and 
15%, [FN176] that such programs inevitably overblock harmless Internet content, which 
adults and minors have a First Amendment right to access, and underblock obscene and 
child pornographic content, which neither adults nor minors have a First Amendment 
right to access. [FN177] The court also found that the provisions of CIPA permitting 
libraries to unblock wrongfully blocked sites upon the request of an adult [FN178] (or in 
some cases a minor) [FN179] who is engaged in "bona fide research or other lawful 
purpose[s]" were insufficient to render the statute constitutional. [FN180] The court 
concluded that, "[g]iven the substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech 
blocked by the filters studied," CIPA failed strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly 
tailored to advance its compelling government interests. [FN181] 
 
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the restrictions CIPA required were not 
unconstitutional, primarily based on the Court's conclusion that these speech restrictions 
were not imposed within a public forum. [FN182] Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored 
a plurality opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined, held that the 
provision of Internet access in public libraries did not constitute a public forum and that 
strict scrutiny was therefore not the proper level of scrutiny for analyzing CIPA's 
constitutionality. [FN183] Rehnquist first explained that Internet access in public libraries 
did not constitute a "traditional public forum" within the constitutional meaning of that 
term because "this resource--which did not exist until quite recently--has not 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public [or], time out of mind, . . . been 
used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions." [FN184] 
 
 Rehnquist then explained that Internet access in public libraries did not constitute 
a "designated public forum," a forum with respect to which "the government [has made] 
an affirmative choice to open up its property for use as a public forum." [FN185] The 
Chief Justice found, with little elaboration, that "[a] public library does not acquire 
Internet terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express 
themselves, [but] . . . to facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by 
furnishing materials of requisite and appropriate quality." [FN186] He observed further 
that "even if appellees had proffered more persuasive evidence that public libraries 
intended to create a forum for speech by connecting to the Internet, we would hesitate to 
import the public forum doctrine . . . wholesale into the context of the Internet." [FN187] 
Having concluded that libraries' provision of Internet access did not constitute a public 
forum, Rehnquist analyzed CIPA's constitutionality under a framework of reduced 
scrutiny, and merely inquired into whether libraries' use of filtering software was 
"reasonable," which he readily found that it was. [FN188] 
 
 Despite the fact that the libraries themselves contended that they had provided 
Internet access to their patrons to facilitate communication and exchange on a "virtually 
unlimited number of topics," Rehnquist declined to extend public forum status (either 
traditional or designated) to the Internet forum at issue and accordingly declined to 
extend meaningful scrutiny to the government's content-based exclusions from that forum 
effected by the statutorily mandated filters. The Court's refusal to accord public forum 
status to libraries' provision of Internet access establishes a dangerous, speech-restrictive 
precedent for the Internet. In this rare instance of public ownership and control over 
Internet speech forums, in which the public entity acknowledges that it created the forum 
to facilitate the exchange of ideas and communication among members of the public on a 
virtually unlimited number of topics, the Court nonetheless held that no public forum was 
involved and that speech restrictions within the forum were therefore immune from 
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny. If no public forum for expression is found in these 
circumstances, it is unlikely that a public forum will ever be recognized in the context of 
the Internet. 
 
 The American Library Ass'n decision is not the first (and likely will not be the last) 
to refuse to extend meaningful First Amendment scrutiny to speech restrictions imposed 
by the government on government-owned computers. Several other cases involving 
government ownership of Internet-accessible computers have declined to subject speech 
restrictions within such forums to strict judicial scrutiny. The case of Urofsky v. Gilmore 
also involved government censorship of First Amendment protected speech on 
government-owned computers. [FN189] The challenged speech restrictions originated in 
1998 when the Commonwealth of Virginia grew concerned about the use of public 
computers by its employees to access sexually-themed expression on the Internet. In an 
attempt to remedy this perceived problem, the legislature enacted the "Restrictions on 
State Employee Access to Information Infrastructure Act." [FN190] Several Virginia 
public college and university professors challenged the constitutionality of the Act, 
[FN191] which restricted the ability of hundreds of thousands of Virginia public 
employees to access sexually explicit (but constitutionally protected) content on 
computers that were owned or leased by the State. Under the statute, public employees 
were prohibited from accessing (without securing advanced written agency approval) 
sexually explicit content on the Internet, where "sexually explicit" was defined quite 
broadly to include, inter alia, "any . . . visual representation . . . depicting . . . a lewd 
exhibition of nudity." [FN192] 
 
 In ruling on the professors' First Amendment challenge, the district court held that 
the statute unconstitutionally restricted "the ability of more than 101,000 public 
employees at all levels of state government to read, research, and discuss sexually 
explicit topics within their areas of expertise, [including] inquiry and debate by 
academics in the fields of art, literature, medicine, psychology, anthropology, and law." 
[FN193] The statute further restricted the rights of members of the public to receive and 
benefit from the speech of state employees on matters within their expertise. 
Because the Act restricted public employees' free speech rights, the court was required by 
First Amendment precedent to conduct its analysis under the special test crafted by the 
Supreme Court for evaluating the First Amendment rights of public employees. [FN194] 
Because the government enjoys greater latitude to restrict the speech of its employees 
versus speech of members of the public generally, this test applies deferential scrutiny to 
restrictions of public employees' work-related expression. Under this test, set forth in the 
Connick [FN195] and Pickering [FN196] cases, courts must first consider whether the 
speech at issue is that of the employee as a private citizen speaking on a matter of public 
concern. If so, then the court must consider whether the employee's interest in her First 
Amendment expression outweighs her employer's interest in regulating such speech for 
the appropriate operation of the workplace. If, however, the court determines that the 
speech at issue is not that of an employee qua private citizen speaking on a matter of 
public concern, then the state, as employer, may regulate the speech without infringing 
any First Amendment protection. [FN197] 
 
 Applying this test, the district court held that the speech of Virginia state 
employees on sexually explicit topics includes speech on matters of public concern that is 
entitled to the fullest First Amendment protection under the required Connick/Pickering 
analysis. The court then held that the Act's restrictions were not properly tailored to 
address the harm that the government allegedly aimed to protect, and therefore that the 
Act was fatally over- and under-inclusive. [FN198] 
 
 The Fourth Circuit disagreed. Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit concluded, with 
little discussion, that the restricted speech at issue did not touch upon a matter of public 
concern and that the state, as employer, could therefore regulate it without infringing any 
First Amendment protection. [FN199] The Fourth Circuit held that the statute "does not 
affect speech by [the professors] in their capacity as private citizens speaking on matters 
of public concern [and that therefore] it does not infringe the First Amendment rights of 
state employees." [FN200] In short, even though the state-imposed restrictions on the 
Internet expression at issue in Urofsky applied to state-owned property, and even though 
we would expect that the First Amendment would have a meaningful role to play in 
holding in check such government restrictions on speech, the Fourth Circuit applied 
reduced scrutiny to the challenged speech restrictions. 
 
 Because private Internet actors--who have the power to regulate and suppress a 
vast amount of Internet speech--are not subject to any First Amendment scrutiny (much 
less the stringent scrutiny imposed under the public forum doctrine), and because after 
American Library Ass'n, even public owners of Internet speech forums will likely not be 
held to meaningful First Amendment scrutiny under the public forum doctrine, 
restrictions of Internet speech are essentially no longer constitutionally prohibited. Thus, 
the important functions served by the First Amendment generally--and by the public 
forum doctrine in particular--are in danger of being seriously eroded in cyberspace. 
 
V. RESTORING THE VALUES OF THE PUBLIC FORUM WITHIN CYBERSPACE 
 
 The evisceration of meaningful First Amendment protection for Internet speech 
and the absence of public forums in cyberspace have important consequences. First, 
individuals who seek to express unpopular views will find it increasingly difficult to do 
so, absent general public forums within which viewpoint discrimination is 
constitutionally prohibited. Second, individuals who seek to criticize others will find it 
more difficult to do so, absent the functional equivalent of interstitial public forums on 
the Internet. 
 
A. Restoring the Values of the General Public Forum Within Cyberspace 
 
 In real space, general public forums provide effective forums for individuals who 
wish to reach broad general audiences but who otherwise would be unable to compete 
within the marketplace for speech. Such speakers' inability (absent the government's 
intervention via the public forum doctrine) may arise from their lack of financial means 
or from the unpopularity of their message. Because the government, under the public 
forum doctrine, has an obligation to open up certain of its property for the use and benefit 
of all speakers, without regard to the content or viewpoint of their message, such speakers 
are guaranteed an opportunity to express their message effectively in real space. 
 
 Some might contend that no such subsidization of unpopular or poorly-financed 
speech is called for in cyberspace. Certainly, as discussed above, it is less expensive to 
express oneself through an Internet discussion forum, website, blog, or e-mail message 
than it is to engage in such expression in real space. And in the past, the Internet has 
generally been a hospitable forum for a broad range of expression. Yet, as private Internet 
actors become less hospitable to unpopular speech in their Internet places and modify 
their terms of use to prohibit communication on unpopular (but First Amendment 
protected) subjects, it will become more difficult for individuals to secure the same type 
of speech protection in cyberspace that they enjoy in real space. Similarly, as public 
Internet actors--like public libraries throughout the United States-- become less 
hospitable to unpopular speech within the Internet forums they control, the obstacles 
confronted by speakers of unpopular messages on the Internet will become formidable. 
To remedy this problem, we need to introduce spaces in which individuals' free speech is 
constitutionally protected instead of leaving the protection of free speech at the mercy of 
private speech regulators. Doing so will require either the courts or the legislature to act. 
Several aspects of First Amendment doctrine must be reconceptualized in order for courts 
to introduce public forum values into cyberspace. First, courts need to reconceptualize the 
"traditional government function" component of the state action doctrine. Second, courts 
need to reconceptualize their analysis of "traditional public forums" within public forum 
jurisprudence. Because current tests require "traditional" actions and places in order for 
First Amendment scrutiny to apply to speech regulations, Internet-related actions and 
places ipso facto will be found to fall outside the protection of these doctrines. No action 
undertaken by a private entity regulating Internet speech will ever be deemed the 
performance of a "traditional state action" sufficient to subject such regulation to First 
Amendment scrutiny under the state action doctrine as it is currently conceived. No 
expressive forum on the Internet will ever be deemed a "traditional" public forum--one 
that has "immemorially" and "time out of mind" been held in trust for the use of the 
public for expressive purposes--under the public forum doctrine as it is currently 
conceived. As a result, speech in such forums will not enjoy the full measure of 
protection under the First Amendment. Courts should therefore rework the 
"traditionality" component of these First Amendment doctrines to incorporate a 
functional analysis of the places in which speech, and speech regulations, occur. 
 
1. Reconceptualizing the "Traditionality" Component 
 
 Courts, notably the Supreme Court in American Library Ass'n, have interpreted 
the public forum analysis too parsimoniously and have placed undue emphasis on 
whether the forum at issue is a traditional one that has "immemorially" or "time out of 
mind" been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, 
and discussion of public questions. [FN201] This emphasis on traditionality and history 
led Chief Justice Rehnquist to conclude in American Library Ass'n that libraries' 
provision of Internet access did not constitute a public forum because "this resource . . . 
did not exist until quite recently." [FN202] 
 
 Courts should reject such a simplistic analysis of public forums, which forecloses 
by its very terms the recognition of an Internet forum as a public forum for First 
Amendment purposes. Instead, courts should undertake a functional analysis to determine 
whether such places are currently widely used for purposes of "communication of 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions" [FN203] and serve the same 
speech-facilitating purposes served in real space by public sidewalks and parks. The 
lower court's three-judge panel in American Library Ass'n is instructive in setting forth a 
reinterpretation of this aspect of the public forum analysis: 
 
Regulation of speech in streets, sidewalks, and parks is subject to the highest 
scrutiny not simply by virtue of history and tradition, but also because the speech-
facilitating character of sidewalks and parks makes them distinctly deserving of 
First Amendment protection. Many of these same speech-promoting features of 
the traditional public forum appear in public libraries' provision of Internet access. 
 
. . . Just as important as the openness of a forum to listeners is its openness to 
speakers. Parks and sidewalks are paradigmatic loci of First Amendment values in 
large part because they permit speakers to communicate with a wide audience at 
low cost. . . . Similarly, given the existence of message boards and free Web 
hosting services, a speaker can, via the Internet, address the public, including 
patrons of public libraries, for little more than the cost of Internet access. . . . 
 . . . . 
. . . A faithful translation of First Amendment values from the context of 
traditional public fora such as sidewalks and parks to the distinctly non-traditional 
public forum of Internet access in public libraries requires that content-based 
restrictions on Internet access in public libraries be subject to the same exacting 
standards of First Amendment scrutiny as content-based restrictions on speech in 
traditional public fora such as sidewalks, town squares, and parks. [FN204] In 
translating the values underlying the public forum doctrine from real space to 
cyberspace, courts should follow the careful analysis of the three-judge panel in 
American Library Ass'n and look to the speech-facilitating functions served by 
Internet forums. 
 
 Furthermore, the original justification for treating only historical and traditional 
public forums as public forums is no longer persuasive. In 1939, the Supreme Court 
initially justified its creation of the public forum doctrine in Hague by adverting to the 
property law doctrine of prescriptive easements (akin to the doctrine of adverse 
possession), through which trespassers can acquire the right to use another's property if 
they have so used the property continuously for an extended period of time. Because the 
Hague Court was seeking a justification for removing from the government its plenary 
rights as a property owner, the Court relied on well-established property law doctrine as a 
justification for so doing. [FN205] The Court explained that since citizens have used 
streets, sidewalks, and public parks "time out of mind" for expressive purposes, they have 
in effect secured an easement by prescription to continue to do so. While the prescriptive 
easement justification, and its reliance on long-term historic use of public property by 
private citizens, may have been important in ushering in the public forum doctrine, 
subsequent courts and theorists have abandoned the prescriptive easements justification 
underlying this prong of the public forum analysis. [FN206] And, as the three-judge 
panel in American Library Ass'n explained, it is more conceptually coherent to look to 
the present purpose and function of the subject forum within our system of democratic 
self-government, rather than the historical uses of such a forum, in determining the level 
of scrutiny to apply to restrictions of speech within it. 
 
 It might be countered that the "traditional public forum" prong of the public 
forum analysis need not be translated to account for new mediums of expression because, 
after all, there is a second prong--the "designated public forum" prong--of the public 
forum analysis. Even if a forum is not deemed a "traditional public forum," it can still be 
deemed a "designated public forum" and thereby secure full First Amendment protection 
as a public forum. The designated public forum prong of the analysis, however, is 
similarly fraught with conceptual difficulties. To be deemed a designated public forum, 
the government must have made "an affirmative choice to open up its property for use as 
a public forum." [FN207] However, the relevant government decision maker knows that 
once it makes such an affirmative choice, any regulations that it imposes upon speech 
within that forum will be subject to strict--and likely fatal--scrutiny. Certainly, in every 
case in which plaintiffs challenge such regulations and claim that such regulations are 
subject to strict scrutiny because they are imposed within a designated public forum, the 
government will defend by claiming that it has not made the requisite affirmative choice 
to designate the forum as a public forum. Accordingly, the "traditional public forum" 
prong of the public forum analysis remains an important one that should be updated and 
translated to enable the First Amendment to protect speech within new communications 
mediums. 
 
2. Following the Lead of State Courts 
  
 If the Supreme Court persists in its parsimonious interpretation of the state action 
doctrine and declines to subject private actors' speech regulations to scrutiny under the 
First Amendment, state courts should interpret their state constitutions' free speech 
clauses to extend to private speech regulations. Precedential support for speech-protective 
interpretations of state constitutions exists in contexts similar to those presented by 
widespread private regulation of Internet speech. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center, [FN208] the California Supreme Court interpreted the free speech protections in 
the California Constitution to apply to regulations imposed by private entities. In 
Pruneyard, several California high school students sought to protest a United Nations' 
resolution opposing "Zionism" by distributing leaflets in a large privately-owned 
shopping mall located in California. [FN209] The case arose subsequent to Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, in which the United States Supreme Court held that students protesting the 
Vietnam War had no First Amendment right to do so within the confines of a privately-
owned shopping center. [FN210] While recognizing that the First Amendment, per the 
Supreme Court's decision in Lloyd, did not grant the high school activists the right to so 
protest, the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution's free speech 
clause granted the protestors this right-- notwithstanding the fact that their protest took 
place on private property. [FN211] In weighing the shopping center's right to exclude 
individuals from its property against the free speech rights of the protestors, the 
California Court interpreted its state constitution to hold that the protestors' free speech 
rights outweighed the mall's private property rights. [FN212] 
 
 The shopping mall challenged the California Supreme Court's decision in the 
United States Supreme Court, claiming that the ruling deprived it of its property without 
just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [FN213] The 
Supreme Court rejected this challenge, holding that California enjoyed the power to 
interpret its state constitution's free speech provisions more broadly than the First 
Amendment (and that so doing did not constitute a taking of property without just 
compensation). The Court explained, "[o]ur reasoning in Lloyd does not . . . limit the 
authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own 
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal 
Constitution." [FN214] The United States Supreme Court also rejected the shopping 
mall's arguments that the state court's holding violated the mall's First Amendment rights 
by forcing it to use its property as a forum for the speech of others with which it disagrees. 
The Court explained, first, that the protestors' speech was unlikely to be identified with 
the shopping mall, and that, in any case, the shopping mall could simply post a notice 
disclaiming any sponsorship of the protestors' speech. [FN215] 
 
 The California Supreme Court further championed the primacy of free speech 
rights over property rights in its recent decision in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi. [FN216] While 
not explicitly relying on Hamidi's free speech rights, the California Supreme Court 
declined to construe Intel's property rights so broadly as to include the right to prohibit 
Hamidi from sending e-mails via Intel's e-mail server. The court recognized that 
extending property rights so broadly would hamper open Internet communication and 
impose costs on society, and implicitly privileged the right to free expression over private 
property rights in this context. 
 
 In short, states are free to define their citizens' free speech rights under their state 
constitutions to incorporate individuals' right to express themselves on private property, 
even if their First Amendment rights do not extend so far. And such an extension of free 
speech rights does not violate the property or free speech rights of the owner of the 
property on which such speech occurs. Following California's lead, states should interpret 
their own constitutions' free speech clauses to grant individuals the right to express 
themselves in privately-owned forums for expression that are the functional equivalent of 
traditional public forums. [FN217] 
 
 States, through their courts or legislatures, should also explicitly define public 
forums to include Internet forums that are generally open to the public for free speech 
purposes, even where such forums are privately owned. Once again, California is 
illustrative. Concerned with what it found to be a "disturbing increase in lawsuits brought 
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of speech," 
[FN218] the California legislature enacted a statute aimed at deterring SLAPP suits--
"strategic lawsuits against public participation." [FN219] This statute grants individuals 
the right to speak and petition freely within "public forums"-- whether such forums are 
publicly or privately owned--free from harassing and meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling 
such speech. In particular, California's anti-SLAPP statute grants individuals the right to 
"dismiss at an early stage non-meritorious litigation meant to chill the valid exercise of 
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition in connection with a public issue." 
[FN220] The statute defines an "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free 
speech" to include "any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the 
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." [FN221] In 
interpreting this language, a California court of appeal recently found that privately-
owned Internet chat rooms and message boards constitute public forums where they are 
"open to the public or to a large segment of the interested community." [FN222] 
California's anti-SLAPP statute thereby grants individuals the right to speak freely on 
matters of public importance in Internet forums, whether publicly or privately owned, 
free from reprisals in the form of meritless lawsuits. 
 
 States should further grant individuals the right to speak freely on matters of 
public importance within Internet forums, free from reprisal in the form of lawsuits 
designed to chill the exercise of their free speech rights or in the form of self-help 
censorship efforts by Internet actors. With the technological tools available to Internet 
actors to censor speech with the click of a mouse, technological measures restricting 
speech present an even greater harm to speakers than lawsuits designed to chill their 
speech. States should define public forums to include privately-owned Internet forums for 
expression that are open to the public and should protect individuals' right to express 
themselves on matters of public interest, broadly construed, within such forums. 
In short, the Supreme Court should meaningfully translate First Amendment values for 
twenty-first century communications media by reconceptualizing the "traditionality" 
requirements in First Amendment doctrine. Courts should analyze the current function of 
the forum at issue within our system of democratic self-government, rather than the 
historic uses of such forums. If the Supreme Court persists in its unwillingness to 
translate First Amendment values to render the right to free expression meaningful in the 
new technological age, then states should interpret their own constitutions' free speech 
clauses--or, in the alternative, enact legislation--to provide individuals with meaningful 
rights to express themselves on the Internet. 
 
B. Restoring the Values of the Interstitial Public Forum Within Cyberspace 
 
 The existence of interstitial public forums in real space provides speakers with 
forums from which to target effectively their speech toward adjacently-located, privately-
owned establishments. Such forums enhance the ability of speakers to target their speech 
effectively toward their desired audience. Because real space is generally characterized 
by the intermingling of publicly and privately-owned property, public property adjacent 
to private property can be used as a launching point from which to target private entities, 
through expression such as picketing, boycotting, and general protesting. 
 
 In translating this function of public forums into the Internet realm, we must first 
consider the appropriate cyberspace analogue to the real space characteristic of adjacency. 
[FN223] In real space, interstitial public forums are valuable because, as a result of their 
physical proximity to privately-owned property, they are particularly well-suited forums 
from which to target privately owned property. Because such physical proximity or 
adjacency has no direct correlate in the Internet realm, we must look to other features that 
enable individuals effectively to target their speech at private entities. 
 
 One important way in which protestors target the objects of their criticism in 
cyberspace is by the use of search terms within Internet search engines. Internet speakers 
who desire to criticize an entity can utilize search terms to capture the attention of 
Internet users generally seeking information about such entities. Just as a real space 
protestor might protest on the sidewalk adjacent to General Motors (GM) to launch a 
targeted attack on GM and to reach individuals seeking out GM in real space, so too a 
cyberspace protestor might choose to launch a targeted attack on GM by utilzing a user's 
search for GM to reach individuals seeking out GM in cyberspace. The cyberprotestor 
may do this in several ways: by using "General Motors" (or other General Motors 
trademarks) as one of the metatags for her critical website; by using a GM-related mark 
as a keyword in her advertisement criticizing GM; or by using GM as part of the domain 
name associated with her critical website. 
  
 In recent years, powerful business owners have wielded trademark law in their 
efforts to silence critics who have made use of the business owners' trademarks to reach 
audiences seeking information on such business owners. Although the case law in this 
area is not uniform, it is clear that trademark owners have been far more successful in 
shutting down such cyberprotestors than they have been in silencing those who launch 
protests against them from adjacent interstitial public forms in real space. First, trademark 
owners have successfully wielded trademark law to prohibit critics from using their 
trademarks as keywords or metatags to drive interested searchers toward information 
critical of the trademark owners. [FN224] Under the recently-enshrined doctrine of 
"initial interest confusion," courts have held that even where individuals seeking out 
information about a business are not confused by such critical sites, the sites nonetheless 
infringe the marks of the business owner. [FN225] Second, trademark owners have 
successfully wielded trademark law [FN226] (as well as the Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy promulgated by ICANN [FN227]) to prohibit critics from using their trademarks 
as part of domain names for their critical websites. 
  
 To translate the values of interstitial public forums into the Internet context, 
courts should limit trademark owners' relief to circumstances in which defendants' 
websites result in actual confusion. Courts should also recognize and protect protestors' 
First Amendment right to use others' marks in critical, non-confusing contexts on the 
Internet. Indeed, surmounting the public-private distinction to protect critics' First 
Amendment rights is not as formidable a hurdle as in the context of general public 
forums. Although it might be supposed that critics have no First Amendment right to use 
others' marks (which are the private intellectual property of these entities) to advance 
their criticisms, courts have in fact long recognized such a right. The case of L.L. Bean, 
Inc. v. Drake Publishers [FN228] is illustrative. In that case, L.L. Bean sought to wield 
infringement and dilution causes of action to silence expressive speech incorporating its 
trademark. High Society, a commercial, adult-oriented magazine, published an article 
parodying the popular L.L. Bean sportswear catalog, under the title "L.L. Beam's Back-
to-School-Sex-Catalog." The article included variations on L.L. Bean's trademarks and 
featured pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions using products similar to 
those offered in L.L. Bean catalogs and described the products in a "crudely humorous 
fashion." [FN229] L.L. Bean, not amused, sued the publisher of High Society for 
trademark infringement and dilution. The district court, while rejecting L.L. Bean's 
infringement cause of action due to lack of confusion, sustained L.L. Bean's cause of 
action for trademark dilution, finding that High Society's parodic use of the L.L. Bean 
mark within this context diluted the mark's distinctive qualities. [FN230] The court 
enjoined publication of the article. [FN231] 
  
 High Society appealed, claiming that the district court's order enjoining 
publication of the article violated its right to freedom of expression and asserting that it 
enjoyed a First Amendment right to use the Bean trademark for expressive purposes. The 
First Circuit agreed, holding that although this case involved a suit between two private 
entities, the lower court's interpretation of the state anti-dilution law to enjoin defendant's 
speech constituted state action restricting expression in violation of the First Amendment. 
[FN232] 
 
 In the Internet context of metatags, key words, and domain names, courts should 
follow the rationale of the L.L. Bean court and protect critics' First Amendment right to 
use the trademarks of another in a non-confusing manner to direct targeted criticism at 
the owner of such marks. Critical websites or advertisements that incorporate their 
target's trademarks as metatags or keywords or as part of their domain names should be 
immune from trademark liability. 
 
 In translating the speech-protective functions of interstitial public forums from 
real space to cyberspace, courts (and arbitrators) should grant broad protection to critical 
speech on the Internet, even where such critical speech incorporates the property of the 
entity subject to criticism and even where such critical speech occurs in expressive 
forums owned and regulated by private actors. Because actual, publicly-owned interstitial 
public forums do not exist in cyberspace, the functions served by such forums--namely, 
the facilitation of effective criticism and protest of "adjacent" private property owners--
must be protected by courts by according wide berth to the use of others' intellectual 
property in cyberspace for purposes of criticism. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 Contrary to the widely-held perception of the Internet as one great public forum 
for individuals to express themselves, the Internet has become transformed by 
privatization into a collection of largely privately-owned and privately-regulated places. 
Because the relevant "property" that makes up the Internet is overwhelmingly privately 
owned, the restrictions on speech imposed by the property owners within such places 
have been held to be outside the purview of the First Amendment. With the Supreme 
Court's contraction of the state action doctrine in recent years, private regulations of 
speech within expressive Internet forums have become essentially immune from scrutiny 
under the First Amendment. Furthermore, even government restrictions on speech within 
expressive Internet forums have become immune from meaningful First Amendment 
scrutiny. 
 
 In this Article, I have argued that the death of public places in cyberspace brings 
with it the erosion of important First Amendment values. Most importantly, the death of 
public places in cyberspace heralds the death of public forums in cyberspace--the most 
important vehicle for the protection of free speech in real space. With the death of public 
forums in cyberspace, long-standing constitutional protections for speech are in danger of 
being seriously eroded in cyberspace. Courts and legislatures must act to remedy this 
problem and faithfully translate First Amendment values to render the values meaningful 
in the new technological age. 
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